Introduction
The Irish election of 2011 saw one of the most severe collapses ever suffered by a governing party in a stable democracy, as Fianna Fáil's (FF) vote fell from 41.6 per cent in 2007 to just 17.4 per cent, a drop of just over 24 points. 1 To put this in context, Powell and Whitten (1993) estimated the typical 'cost' of governing at just 3.5 per cent. Volatility in the election was assessed at 29.6 on the Pedersen Index, making this the third most volatile election in longestablished European democracies since 1945, and certainly the most volatile without the presence of a significant new party (Mair, 2011) . FF had dominated Irish politics since its first election victory in 1932, and had never before won less than 39 per cent in a general election. While the result was dramatic, it was hardly unexpected. The election came just three months after Ireland had been visited by a team from the IMF and ECB tasked with identifying Ireland's borrowing requirements after catastrophic economic collapse and strict policies were to be put in place to ensure repayment.
During the 2007 election campaign few had claimed that the 'Celtic tiger' days of rapid growth were likely to continue, but all parties had sought to outbid one another with promises of spending more and taxing less. Only sixteen months later fears of collapse in Ireland's banking institutions led the government to offer a comprehensive guarantee to all depositors and bondholders. Credit facilities dried up, and the construction sector, the main driver of growth in the previous few years, contracted rapidly. State revenues were dependent upon house purchase taxes to an unhealthy degree and the government was forced reverse 15 years of policy by initiating sharp reductions in public spending and significant increases in taxation. Over the next 30 months growth rates became negative, unemployment levels doubled, from 7 per cent to almost 15 per cent, public sector wages were cut by an average of 13 per cent, government services were reduced and capital projects delayed or abandoned. Introducing his pre-election budget in December 2010, the Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, explained that the government had already made a significant adjustment in the public finances. Without it, the deficit would already have ballooned to more than 20 per cent of GDP as opposed to the 12 per cent at which it then stood. The budget approved by parliament after the ECB/IMF 'bailout' included a combination of further cuts and tax increases designed to close this projected deficit to just 9 per cent of GDP. Continued reductions in current spending set out in late 2010 in the National Recovery Plan 2011-2014 were intended to bring spending back to 2007/2008 levels and the deficit down to only 3 per cent. Small wonder that the government lost the election. Even so, FF's decline was precipitous.
Anderson, reviewing the literature on economic voting up to 2007, called into question one of the best-known maxims for predicting elections -"it's the economy, stupid" -as well as, more significantly, the role of elections in providing accountability. He concluded that the economy-vote link is "intermittent, highly contingent, and substantively small" (Anderson, 2007: 286 ). An extensive comparative study estimated the median economic vote at 5 per cent, the consequence of a "moderate decline in perceptions of economic fortunes" (Duch and Stevenson, 2008: 64) . We would expect the decline in perceptions in Ireland to exceed anything that could be described as 'moderate', but it would appear to have to be very much greater to account for a change five times that of the median. This might suggest that this decline is attributable to factors beyond simply economic perceptions.
Duch and Stevenson's analysis is just one of many published in recent years exploring not simply the strength of the economic vote but also the variations in that strength across political contexts. Explanations for variations in the strength of such effects focus on different aspects of the long causal chain between the real performance of the economy and vote choice. The first set concerns the link between objective economic change and subjective evaluations: statistics may show the economy getting better or worse, but how effectively is that information absorbed by voters and translated into perceptions of economic conditions? The second set focus on the link between evaluations and the attribution of responsibility. Political institutions can obscure responsibility (Powell and Whitten, 1993) ; increasing globalisation limits the policy menu available and increases local dependence on global economic performance (Duch and Stevenson, 2010) ; attitudinal constraints on apportioning credit or blame, such as partisanship (Rudolph, 2003) can also serve to limit, or exaggerate the electoral impact of the economy. A third set concerns the translation of attributed evaluations into a decision to vote for a particular party. The ease with which voters desert a party is variable. This may be simply a feature of party preference structures across a number of issues (van der Brug et al., 2007) , but it may be that a party has a reputation for competence (Duch and Stevenson, 2010) that is eroded by economic performance in a manner that is not linear. In 1992 'Black Wednesday' marked an abrupt shift in the British Conservative party's economic credibility when the government was forced to withdraw the pound from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The decision lost the Conservative government the next election (Whiteley, 1997) .
The Irish case can be considered in the light of these three linkages. As far as the first is concerned, there was a heavy concentration on the economic crisis in the media, particularly from the bank guarantee onwards, and the public was paying much greater attention. It is possible that in these circumstances public perceptions might have led economic indicators, but we would expect that the public would have been very conscious of the worsening economy.
The second link is the allocation of blame. In recent years FF had 'owned' the economy as an issue, apparently securing votes on the basis of its successful stewardship since 1997. Focus group research by RED C suggested that voters in 2007 would be even more likely to support FF if they saw clouds on the economic horizon, findings that inhibited opposition parties from pointing out that the economy was fragile at best. Finally, we should consider the attractiveness of the opposition: did it offer a reasonable alternative? The Irish party system has had a narrow ideological range and party attachment is low, with no more than a quarter of voters willing to describe themselves as being 'close' to a party in 2007 (Marsh, 2009: xx) . In sum, conditions in 2011, which supported a consciousness of economic decline and a perception, despite is to explore when support for FF began to fall away, and see how well that links to the times of change in the economy. The third aim is to establish whether or not critical time points, such as those identified above, had an importance equal to or exceeding the economic series tracing the crisis. It is argued here that the scale of the reversal suffered by FF exceeds that which might normally be expected to flow from changes in levels of inflation, growth or unemployment.
Economic assessments and voting in 2011
We have already given some indication of the extent of the decline in the Irish economy between 2007 and 2011, but Table 1 
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While inflation had fallen, unemployment was increasingly negative, as was consumer confidence; growth was low and the public deficit had ballooned.
We will explore these indicators in more detail below but first we will examine what voters in 2011 thought about the economic record.
The most widespread indicator of economic perceptions in the context of electoral behaviour is one that asks voters to evaluate the recent behaviour of the economy. The 2011 Irish National Election Study asked voters to assess economic performance over the previous three years or so, making it explicit that this was the lifetime of the current government. This echoed the format of a question asked in previous years. Table 2 
The timing of Fianna Fáil's decline
Public confidence in FF did not wither slowly. Figure 1 shows the record of voting intentions in the polls, using just those carried out (typically for the The thesis argued here can be explored statistically. Table 3 In the next section we will examine the economic record in more detail and see how this 'crisis of confidence' model fits into a more conventional economic vote function.
Economic trends and an economic vote function
The changes described above in terms of critical events can also be looked at using more conventional indicators, such as growth, unemployment and inflation, and also measures of economic confidence amongst the electorate.
It is important not only to examine these as a record of economic decline, but also to see whether the periods we have identified above relate clearly to the objective economy, or even the economy as perceived by voters. In Figure 2 we show four indicators of economic health over the six-year period covered here and in Figure 3 we map each of the four economic series onto a line graph of FF popularity, using the monthly series used in Table 3 . closely only from late 2010, again seeming to lead rather than follow. While it is arguable that the low FF vote in February 2011 had its roots in rapidly rising unemployment, falling or zero growth and negative inflation, as well as very significant consumer pessimism, the timing of that party's decline suggests that it took some time for this economic message to translate into a withdrawal of support for the party. In an earlier section we suggested that the economic vote function required that people perceived the economy as it was, and that they held the government responsible, and then voted accordingly.
The first part of this is clear enough. Consumer confidence tracks growth quite well, and fell before unemployment started to increase. The second and third parts of the story took longer to catch up. While we have no series of data on responsibility, over 80 per cent of voters in 2011 did hold FF accountable for the economic downturn, and the disasters that followed that downturn.
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Next we test whether the economy can explain the decline in FF popularity better than the quasi-experimental model presented in Table 3 . Following the approach used in economic voting we explain FF popularity with sequential additions of individual economic indicators (Models 2-5) and a combined model that includes all economic variables (Model 6). All models also include dummies for both crisis events. The models do not include time trends. This omission allows us to capture any time-series effects of the economic variables. Because this in turn leads to significant autocorrelation in the error term, we estimate the models using the Newey-West estimator, which is a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator of the standard errors. 8 For consistency we also include the Newey-West estimator of our interrupted time-series model (Model 1).
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The results in Table 4 indicate that, apart from unemployment, no individual economic variable has any effect on FF support beyond the effect of the two crisis dummies. Furthermore, the results in Models 2-5 are broadly consistent with our baseline results from the interrupted time series analysis in Model 1.
Those in the last column (Model 6) stand out as being generally weaker than any other model. This is possibly due to it being more demanding, with a relatively large number of variables for the given number of observations.
However, even in this model unemployment and the dummies do all the talking. Tests of joint significance allow us to overwhelmingly reject the joint hypothesis that the model excluding both dummies is correctly specified relative to the full model in all models (Models 1-6).
Discussion and conclusions
The decline in support for the dominant government party in the 2011 election was remarkable, but hardly inexplicable. Indeed, given that the election took place with the country in receivership, and given that FF had been in government since 1997, we might well have expected the electorate to serve as a rational god of punishment and reward, with punishment being the operative term in this instance. Even so, a sanction so severe is not easily Even then the dismal economic news did not have further impact until another episode two years later persuaded the public that things were even worse than it had believed, and confirmed that FF was to blame. Table 4 Simple interrupted time series model compared to models including economic explanations of the decline in FF support. Note: Models are based on simple economic voting models. All models are estimated using the Newey-West estimator to produce heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (we used three lags in estimation). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
